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Abstract Banking is increasingly a-spatial. However, the environment matters 
for small banks. Indeed, they are embedded in narrowed markets and hence 
benefit from proximity to their member-customers. By referring to  multilevel 
approach, this article aims at measuring how much the performance of Italian 
mutual-cooperative banks is determined by both geographical (provincial 
level) and individual characteristics (small bank level). The effect of local 
markets explains 28.27% of bank heterogeneity in the empty multilevel model 
and 33% in the most extended model. Moreover, it is found that bank 
efficiency increases with market concentration and demand density and 
decreases with branching in local markets. 
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1 Introduction  
A large amount of data in social sciences follows a hierarchical order. Returns to education are 
related to pupils’ skills and efforts. In reality students are nested in classes, which are further 
nested in schools. Again, firm performances are the result of individual behavior, although the 
environment in which they operate is crucial (Beugelsdijk 2007). In the field of industrial and 
regional economics, the hierarchical structure of micro-data has recently been handled by 
recurring to multilevel models (hereafter MLMs), which have been proved to perform well in 
estimating the spatial effect on firms productivity (Aiello et al. 2014, 2015; Fazio and 
Piacentino 2010; Van Oort et al. 2012), on firm attitude to cooperation in innovation (Srholec 
2015) and in understanding the link between urbanization and firm innovativeness (Srholec 
2010). 
In banking, the recurrence of clustered data is more difficult, as this industry tends to 
be dominated by big-banks, whose organization is increasingly complex and, very often, a-
spatial. However, even in banking there is a phenomenon that can be modeled through MLMs. 
It regards small-banks, which act as single-market entities. In other words, they are 
embedded in narrowed markets, thereby representing a good example of hierarchy: small-
banks are at the lowest level of the hierarchy, while the higher level is  the local market in 
which they act. 
                                                          
  The authors would like to thank Sergio De Stefanis and Damiano Silipo for very useful comments 
and suggestions on the first version of this paper. Editorial assistance by John Richard Broughton is 
also acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies. At the time of writing this paper Graziella 
Bonanno was post-doc visiting student at the Royal Docks Business School, University of East 
London. She received a Research Fellowship from the Regione Calabria and EU Commission. The 
views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect 
the official policy or position of the EU Commission and the Regione Calabria. 
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The embeddedness of small-banks in local markets makes it easy to argue that 
environmental factors influence individual performance. This is not a novelty, as it is 
addressed by a massive literature exploring the bank performance-environment nexus.1 
Surprisingly, this literature refers to single-equation models that are too limited in handling 
the multilevel nature of data featuring small-banks behavior. On the contrary, the 
embeddedness can be properly treated by MLMs (Goldstein 2003; Luke 2004), which are very 
attractive also from an economic perspective, because they address how the micro-, mid- and 
macro-spheres of economic systems evolve and interact. Indeed, if the first-level unit-of-
analysis, the small bank, is embedded in a local market, then its performance cannot be 
addressed without taking into consideration the interactions from micro- to macro-level, and 
vice-versa, as multilevel does (Baldwin and Okubo 2006; Beugelsdijk 2007).2 In this respect  
the hierarchical approach makes an important contribution to empirical studies aimed at 
understanding the individual performance and the links between micro- and macro-patterns 
(Aiello et al. 2014; Raspe and van Oort 2011; Srholec 2010, 2015). 
These general considerations introduce the methodological advantages of MLMs over 
the single-equation framework. The latter disregards the nested structure of data,  even 
though it is widely known that ignoring this structure yields biased estimates of standard 
errors and a subsequent increase in Type I error (Hox 2002).3 Furthermore, MLMs combine 
different levels of data aggregation and relate them in ways that render the simultaneous 
existence of distinct level-one (small banks) and level-two (local markets) equations explicit. 
This allows the evaluation of whether, and to what extent, local factors matter in determining 
small-banks performance. In fact, on the one hand the role of contextual factors is detected by 
testing hypothesis operating at different levels; on the other hand, MLMs decompose  
heterogeneity in the output variable, providing a highly informative outcome on “how much” 
contextual and individual factors contribute to small-banks performance. Finally, compared to 
single-equation models, MLMs address the issue of error correlation across small-banks and 
ecological and atomistic fallacies  (Heck and Thomas 2000; Hox 2002; Mass and Hox 2004).  
As MLMs have never been used to study the role of context in banking, this paper tries 
to fill this gap. It refers to an MLM specification which is consistent with the hierarchical 
structure of data as well as with the fact that small-banks are observed over time. Thus, we 
refer to an MLM for longitudinal panel, given that multiple measurement at different time 
points (level 1) are nested within small-banks (level 2), which are further nested in local 
markets (level 3). In order to  represent time changes, a growth linear MLM with a random 
intercept as well as random slopes is considered. Furthermore, the analysis is expanded by 
including a set of predictors at each level of the hierarchy that is retrieved from the banking 
literature.  
                                                          
1 See, above many others, Battaglia et al. (2010), Bos and Kool (2006), Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 
(2000),  Girardone et al. 2004). Hughes and Mester (2008) is a comprehensive survey on this topic. 
2 The links between agents and external factors are modeled from different perspectives. For instance, 
the endogenous growth theory proves the existence of increasing returns due to spillovers between 
firms and other higher level organizations (Romer 1986). However, it refers to uni-equational 
macro models and focuses on aggregate patterns, although they have micro-foundations. Again, the 
existence of micro-macro interactions is also recognized by the evolutionist school. However, here 
the links are one-way, in the sense that they flow from the individual to the aggregate level (Dosi 
and Nelson 2010). This implies that the “overall” patterns are just those from aggregations, while 
any other important environmental factor is left out of the analysis. 
3  In MLMs the inference is made by distinguishing between sample size at the different levels of data 
aggregation. One consequence of failing to recognize hierarchical structures is that standard errors 
of regression coefficients will be underestimated, leading to an overstatement of statistical 
significance. 
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Besides the method, another element of originality of this paper comes from the 
analyzed case-study, regarding Italian mutual-cooperatives banks (hereafter MCBs). This is an 
interesting case because in Italy, as well as in many other countries, banking has been 
strongly deregulated over the last two decades.4  
An important reform was the relaxing of geographic constraints, allowing banks to 
open branches wherever, thereby inducing a territorial diversity in banking and more 
competition even in the periphery. Despite these profound changes, the permanence of a 
plethora of small-banks appears a paradox, as MCBs survival is threatened by two main 
forces. Firstly, the increased action of complex financial conglomerates forces the 
disappearance of small entities: in a world of big-banks, small credit institutions are expected 
to disappear. Secondly, MCBs historically operated in narrow isolated markets, which, now, 
are no longer protected by regulatory barriers. If local markets become contestable, then it is 
expected that MCBs will lose their quasi-monopoly power which, in the past, assured 
profitability (Coccorese 2009; Fiordelisi and Mare 2013) Differently from expectations, MCBs 
reacted to reforms by re-organizing their network through within-group M&A and thus 
preserving their presence in local markets (Gutiérrez 2008).5 Finally, the interest in 
evaluating the role of local market conditions on MCBs performance is amplified by the fact 
that the banking sector remains highly heterogeneous in Italy, with marked territorial 
differences throughout the country.  
Covering the 2006-2011 period, this paper uses micro-data from the “Italian Banking 
Association” and provincial data from Bank of Italy and ISTAT (the Italian Institute of 
Statistics). MCBs performance is measured by the cost efficiency scores, which have been 
estimated through the stochastic frontier approach.  
The main results are as follows: after having found that there is heterogeneity in MCBs 
performance at the beginning of the period and in the trajectory of change over time, it is 
shown that the differences in MCBs internal characteristics matter. However, location across 
Italian provinces plays a relevant role in explaining MCBs behavior. To be more precise, in the 
most extended MLM specification, 31% of the variance in MCBs cost efficiency is due to banks 
characteristics and 33% is ascribable to location, while the remaining 36% is due to the time-
effect over the turbulent years crisis under scrutiny. We also find significant links between 
MCBs efficiency and a number of variables (i.e., market concentration, branching, demand 
density) capturing the local market conditions.   
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents models and data; Section 3 
discusses the results; section 4 concludes. 
 
  
                                                          
4 The major reforms go back to the 1990s' when the 1990 Amato-Carli Act, the EU Directive II and the 
1993 Consolidated Act. During the successive decade, the 2002 budget law, the 262/2005 law and 
the 353/2006 Legislative Decree sped up the processes of consolidation and market competition. 
Details are in Giannola (2009), Messori et al. (2003) and Silipo (2009). 
5 At the end of 2013 there were 385 (411 in 2011) MCBs, while in the early ’90s they were 700. 
However, a consolidation process in the network occurred involving mostly MCBs, with the result 
that the number of branches even doubled in ten years, rising from 2226 in 1993 to 4454 in 2013. 
In relative terms, in 2013 MCBs branches made up 14% of total national branches, which is a value 
4 percentage points higher than that of 1993. 
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2 The empirical setting: model, data and variables 
2.1 The model  
Understanding whether and how market conditions affect small banks performance is a 
typical example of hierarchy, in the sense that the units (small banks) refer to different levels 
of aggregation (local markets) (Goldstein 2003). If there is a nested structure of data, single-
level methodologies will suffer from some estimation problems. First, as a result of locally 
specific factors, small banks operating in a market are likely to be more similar than small 
banks located in differing areas, implying that residuals are not independent. This issue is 
addressed by the multilevel approach which, controlling for territorial-effects, ensures more 
efficient estimates than those of the uni-equational model. In addition, single-level regressions 
yield an inflated significance of level-two coefficients because the diagnostics refers to the 
number of level-one observations instead of the number of higher-level units. It is likely that 
the significant relationships found in OLS regressions will turn out not to be significant in 
multilevel regressions. In other words, the multilevel model controls for spatial dependence 
and corrects the measurement of standard errors, so reducing the risk of type I errors.  
Apart from the statistical improvements, another advantage of the multilevel model is 
that variables at different levels are not simply add-ons to the same single-level equation, but 
are linked together in ways that make the simultaneous existence of distinct level-one and 
level-two equations explicit. In such a way, level-two factors are used not just as independent 
variables to explain variability in a level-one dependent variable, but also to explain 
variability in random intercept and random slopes (Bickel 2007). However, in order to 
explain the variability in random coefficients, a “sufficient” number of clusters in the sample is 
required. Otherwise the between-group variance is poorly estimated. In this respect, there is 
no clear result (Richter 2006), although  there are some rules of thumb, which, however, are 
very different from each other.6 In our empirical setting, this issue is absent as the number of 
groups are large enough to ensure the reliability of results.  
In this study, MCBs are observed over the 2006-2011 period. The six time points are 
the first level of the analysis, while MCBs and local markets constitute, respectively, the 
second and the third levels of our hierarchy. The three-level units refer to local banking 
markets that are identified with the Italian provinces (NUTS 3 codes) whose initial number is 
103. As in some provinces the number of MCBs is limited (even zero), the analysis is 
performed by considering 66 provinces with more than two small banks per year. On the 
other hand, the number of small-banks is high in other markets (see appendix Table A1). This 
heterogeneity in cluster-size is the motivation behind the choice to use a three-level model for 
longitudinal data with randomness in intercepts and slopes. Since data follow a longitudinal 
structure, the MLM specification treats time as a source of randomness both in the intercepts 
and slopes at any level. The dependent variable y refers to MCBs (second-level) in a specific 
time period (first-level) and depends on a set, say MCB, of variables measured at individual 
bank level and on a set, say P, of variables defined at provincial level (third level of the 
hierarchy).  The dependent variable can be predicted as follows (level-one model): 
                                                          
6 Some authors suggest 20 groups (Heck and Thomas 2000; Rabe-Hasketh and Skondal 2008), others 
30 (Hox 2002) or 50 (Mass and Hox 2004). In addition, it is worth noting that the clusters must be 
sized with at least two observations in random-effects models. In the random effect specification, 
smaller groups have a smaller impact on the estimation results than larger groups (Snijders and 
Berkof 2008). This approach recognises that there is little information for small groups by 
“shrinking” their residual estimates towards zero and, therefore, pulling their mean towards the 
overall mean (Bickel 2007). 
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tijijjttijijtij eTimePMCBy  ..210      [1] 
where tijy  is the vector of the estimated MCBs cost efficiency; ij0  is the intercept, ij1  are the 
slope coefficients and 
tije  is the random error term with zero mean and variance 
2
e ; ij.  is the 
slope associated to the time variable; t is for time (t=2006…2011), j is for province (j=1…p) and 
i states for MCB in province j (i=1…Nj). The error term tije  captures not only residual variance, 
as OLS regression does, but also potential group-to-group variability in the random intercepts 
and slopes. In eq.[1] 
tije  are not independently distributed, because of nesting: MCBs 
operating in the same province tend to have correlated residuals, so violating the assumption 
of independence. 
The parameters 
ij0  and ij.  of eq. [1] vary across banks and provinces. At MCBs level 
they are modelled as: 
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Substituting eq.[2] in eq.[1] yields: 
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Similarly, 
j00  and j0.  of eq. [3]  may be expressed as: 
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Substituting eq.[4] in eq.[3] and after algebra manipulations one gets the full mixed model: 
 
tijijjijjjttijtij eTimeuTimeuuuTimePMCBy  .0.00000..21000     [5] 
where 000  is the overall mean, iju0  is random departure from the overall mean due to the i-th 
MCB, 
ju00  is  random departure from the overall mean due to the j-th province, iju.  captures 
the departure from the common linear trend due to the i-th MCB and  
ju 0.  is the departure 
from the common linear trend due to the j-th province. Finally, ),0( etij Ne   represents the 
deviation due to time effect.  
The econometric model [5] is composed by a deterministic part - 
TimePMCB jttij 00..21000    - which contains all the fixed coefficients - and by a stochastic 
component - which is represented by u-terms and 
tije . Besides tije , the stochastic part is the 
sum of two components: the Timeuu jj 0.00   is the random part associated with level-three of 
the model, while Timeuu ijij .0   is related to the level-two model 
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An important aspect of MLMs is that they allow the decomposition of the  MCBs 
heterogeneity in efficiency to the contribution of unobserved factors at any level of data 
aggregation. To this end, let’s consider the “empty” specification of eq. [5], i.e. the model 
without time and explanatory variables: 
tijijjtij euuy  000000     [6] 
Eq. [6] allows the decomposition of the unobserved variance of y into three 
independent components, i.e. the variance of 
tije  (
2
e ), the so-called within-group variance, 
the variance of 
ju00  (
2
uj ), also known as between-group variance for provinces and the 
variance of 
iju0  (
2
ui ), which is the between-group variance for MCB-level.  
A useful index to evaluate the relative magnitude of the variance components is the 
intra-class correlation (ICC). It measures the proportion of the response variance that lies at 
each level of the hierarchy. ICCs is calculated level-by-level and differ model-by-model. For 
instance, as far as the provinces are concerned, the ICC is given by the ratio of the variance at 
that level, 2
ui ,  to the total variance, that is: 
222
2
eij
j
jICC





       [7] 
Similarly, the  ICCs for MCB and time level are, respectively: 
222
2
eij
i
iICC





     [8] 
222
2
eij
e
tICC


 
     [9] 
Of course when considering the full mixed model (eq. 5), the ICCs take into account the entire 
structure of variance, as randomness also entails time-slopes. Put differently, eq. [7]-[9]  refer 
to a general formulation of MLM model, in the sense that comprise all the alternatives arising 
from the combination of the sources of randomness. For instance, for eq. [5] we have that 
slope_intercept_ 222 jjj     and slope_intercept_
222
iii    . At the opposite side, 
when estimating a random intercept model (for both MCBs and provincial levels as in eq. [6]), 
the variance is given by intercept_22 jj     and intercept_
22
ii    . In between these two 
extremes there are other MLM specifications, depending on whether modelling the slopes 
randomness due to time.  
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2.2 Data at bank level  
Microdata are from the Italian Banking Association (ABI) which collects balance-sheets of 
about 97% of Italian banks. This dataset contains information of more than 400 MCBs per 
year. After cleaning data procedure, an unbalanced panel of 2334 observations is used.7 On 
average they are more than 63% of the sample [the remaining are corporations (32%) and 
Popolari banks (6%)]. It is noteworthy to point out that, over the 2006-2011 period, MCBs 
size is, on average, 295M Euro (Table 1), that is to say about thirty times smaller than the size 
of other banks (6,903M Euro).   
Table 1 highlights that cost efficiency of MCBs is 0.80, thereby meaning that MCBs should 
reduce the inputs of 20% offering the same banking services (or similarly they should 
increase outputs of 20% with the same inputs). Data indicate that cost efficiency is quite 
dispersed (the minimum value is 0.24 and the maximum is 0.98). Its dynamics over the six 
year-points 2006-2011 is displayed in Figure 1 (Panel A). It is clear that there is a 
considerable inter-MCBs heterogeneity at the beginning year 2006 and a high variation over 
time. The red line refer to the intercept and growth for the whole sample of MCBs. Figure 1 
also plots the MCBs cost efficiency by province and year. Panels B-D of Figure 1 indicate that 
the within and between group heterogeneity is high across all provinces (Panel B), whichever 
the MCBs location in Northern (Panel C) or in Southern provinces (Panel D). These visual 
representations of cost-efficiency further legitimate the use of MLM for longitudinal data, 
whose estimations provide a statistical test of the variability in intercepts and growth terms - 
as depicted in Figure 1.a - and  of the role of any hierarchical level of data in explaining the 
variability of individual outputs. 
Turning back to Table 1, when referring to the cost income the average is 0.73, with a 
minimum at 0.4 and the maximum at 3.53. The analysis of other individual profiles reveals 
that MCBs activities are weakly diversified in terms of income or loans diversification.8 
Income diversification is 0.21, while MCBs loan diversification is 0.32. MCBs ability to 
transform deposits into loans is, on average, 1.51. Interestingly, the ratio Equity/Total Assets 
is significantly low (0.018), thereby meaning that MCBs show high financial dependence. 
  
                                                          
7 The size of our panel is data driven and corresponds to the number of the estimated values of cost 
efficiency, which is the dependent variable used in our multilevel models. We drop from the MCBs 
with missing (or zero-) values of total assets and employees. Cost efficiency estimations are from a 
stochastic translog frontier in the specification proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995). The cost 
equation is a 3-inputs-3-outputs model, while the inefficiency equation only controls for bank-type 
(MCBs, Popolari and Ltd) and location effects. This has two advantages. Firstly, estimations refer to 
a national cost frontier, ensuring comparability of the estimated efficiency, as MCBs performance is 
relative to the rest of the industry. This allows for between-groups effect to be controlled. Secondly, 
the estimated efficiency scores are net of any institutional and geographical effect. Results from 
stochastic frontier estimations are available upon request.   
8 Income diversification is calculated as [Income Commissions /(Income Commissions + Net Interests 
Income)], while loans diversification is (1-Loans/Total Assets). 
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Figure 1  
MCBs cost efficiency by time and province (2006-2011) 
 
 
 2.2 Data at provincial level  
The estimation of an MLN requires a set of variables capturing the local market conditions. As 
already mentioned, this paper refers to the province (NUTS3 code) as reference market of 
MCBs. An analysis based on larger territories, for example regions (NUTS2) as in Battaglia et 
al (2010), could suffer from aggregation bias. Phrased differently, it is plausible that the 
greater the proximity of MCBs to markets the more precise will be the investigation of the 
individual efficiency-environment nexus. Thus, using provinces as territorial unit-of-analysis 
assures that MCBs performance can be intended as the result of banking relationships 
between MCBs and the “residents”.  
 This said, this section documents some characteristics of banking markets across 103 
out of 110 Italian provinces.9  Data are from Bank of Italy. An important effect of the 
restructuring reform is the spatial diffusion of financial services. Several proxies can be used 
as an indicator of this. For instance, the bank branches by square kilometer measures the 
density by province. It is on average 0.0014, with considerable variation across provinces (it 
varies from 0.0002 for Crotone to 0.0129 for Milan in 2006-2011). An additional indicator is 
the ratio “Bank Branches/Municipalities” per province, which is, on average, more than 5 in 
2006-2011 (it ranges from more than 20 branches per municipality in the provinces of Trieste 
and Prato to less than one branch per municipality in the provinces of Isernia, Oristano and 
Vibo Valentia). Along this line of reasoning, further evidence comes from the concentration of 
provincial markets. The Hirschman-Herfindahl index calculated using, by year, the number of 
                                                          
9   Including information of 7 new provinces undermines data comparability over time. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
CEtij Fitted values
Panel A
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel B
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel C
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel D
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branches per bank (HH1) in every province is 0.125 over the years 2006-2011, falling in the 
range 0.036-0.537. Higher average market concentration is revealed when considering total 
bank assets (HH2).10 In this case, the HH2 index averaged by year and province is 0.208 
(about two times higher than the average of HH1) varying from 0.030 and 0.506. Finally, there 
has been a relevant increase of big-bank participation in the periphery. The  top-3 national 
banks - as revealed by the total assets averaged over 2006-2011 -  owned 21% of bank 
branches operating in every Italian province (Table 1). 11 
 Another issue concerns the traditional function of banks, namely the transformation of 
deposits into loans. The Bank of Italy provides the required data taking into account the 
residence of customers and depositors. High values of this ratio mean that the provincial 
banking sector is issuing more of its deposits in loans at provincial level, which, in turn, means 
it releases more income. Over 2006-2011 the provincial ratio Loans/Deposits is on average 
1.548. The highest value (3.046) is in Milan, whereas the lowest (0.729) refers to the province 
of Trieste. A related issue to offering funds is that loans are not always repaid.  In Italy, bad 
performing loans are 6.38% of total loans in 2006-2011, with a different incidence across 
provinces. In some provinces (Milan, Sondrio and Siena), bad-loans are low (less than 2%), 
while they are very high (more than 10%) in Avellino, Benevento, Caserta, Crotone, 
Caltanissetta, Enna, Frosinone, Isernia, Latina, Nuoro, Potenza, Reggio di Calabria, Taranto, 
Vibo Valentia and with a peak of 18.45% in Matera. Finally, there is also great heterogeneity 
when looking at the credit provided by banks: the loans-to-GDP ratio which ranges from the 
highest value of Milan (3.454) to the lowest values (0.392) of Vibo Valentia. It is interesting to 
point out that data of Table 1 reflect the North-South dualism of the Italian economy. Indeed, 
in the South of the country there is less access to banking services, more concentration of 
bank branches, low financial development and loans/deposits ratio, while the incidence of 
non-performing  loans is high (Table 1).  
 From the above discussion one learns that the local banking market conditions are still 
extremely heterogeneous across Italian provinces. This marked heterogeneity further 
motivates the understanding of the nexus between local determinants and MCBs 
performance. 
  
                                                          
10 Data needed to calculate HH2 is the value of total assets by the i-th bank in every province j (TAij). 
Since this information is not freely available in Italy, as well as in many other countries, we proceed 
through this calculation: TAij=TAi*bij, where TAi is the balance-sheet amount of Total Asset (TA) of 
the i-th bank and bij is the proportion of branches of bank i in province j (bij=BBij/BBj). This 
procedure is proposed by Carbò Valverde et al. (2003). 
11 The role of big-banks in local markets is more apparent when looking at their total assets shares. 
The top-3 banks absorbed (on average) 73% of  total assets at provincial level in 2006-2011 (table 
1). The territorial distribution of this market share shows a minimum of 51% in Benevento and a 
maximum in Siena (more than 90%). It is worth pointing out that in 22 out of 103 Italian provinces, 
the top-3 national banks absorb more than 80% of local total assets Alessandria,  Aosta,  Como, 
Imperia, Mantua, Milan,  Novara, Pavia, Turin, Belluno, Arezzo, Grosseto, Massa, Siena, Lecce, 
Agrigento, Caltanissetta, Enna, Messina, Ragusa, Syracuse, Trapani (detailed statistics for each 
province are available upon request). 
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Table 1   
Overview of data at bank and provincial level over the 2006-2011 period 
 
Number of 
Observations 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Data at bank level 
     
Size 2334 295.30 376.22 4.4400 5465.35 
Cost Efficiency  2334 0.8034 0.0706 0.2426 0.9779 
Cost Income 2334 0.7267 0.1662 0.4049 3.5340 
Income Diversification 2334 0.2102 0.0669 0.0013 0.7102 
Loans Diversification 2334 0.3207 0.1277 0.0959 0.9758 
Loans/Deposits 2334 1.5080 0.5759 0.0650 4.0582 
Equity/Total Assets 2334 0.0175 0.0533 0.0001 1.1972 
            
Data at provincial level                                            
 (All Italian provinces)           
Branches by square Km 103 0.0014 0.0016 0.0002 0.0129 
Branches per municipality 103 5.2915 4.5120 0.6630 23.78 
Market concentration on bank branches (HH1) 103 0.1245 0.0701 0.0360 0.5370 
Market concentration on total assets (HH2) 103 0.2084 0.0902 0.0300 0.5060 
Share of the top 3 banks (by Total Assets) 103 0.7265 0.0904 0.5063 0.9058 
Share of the top 3 banks (by bank branches) 103 0.2083 0.0901 0.0297 0.5055 
Loans/deposits 103 1.5477 0.4603 0.7290 3.0460 
Non performing loans 103 6.3806 3.4688 1.2700 18.45 
Financial development (Loans/GDP) 103 0.9681 0.4423 0.3920 3.4540 
            
Data at provincial level                              
 (Southern Italian provinces)   
    
Branches by square Km 34 0.0007 0.0011 0.0002 0.0070 
Branches per municipality 34 3.5478 2.8884 0.6630 12.1670 
Market concentration on bank branches (HH1) 34 0.1489 0.1037 0.0750 0.5370 
Market concentration on total assets (HH2) 34 0.1959 0.0851 0.0760 0.3340 
Share of the top 3 banks (by Total Assets) 34 0.7045 0.1001 0.5063 0.8610 
Share of the top 3 banks (by bank branches) 34 0.1958 0.0851 0.0762 0.3342 
Loans/deposits 34 1.1743 0.2169 0.8800 1.7390 
Non performing loans 34 9.9692 2.9201 5.1860 18.4490 
Financial development (Loans/GDP) 34 0.6363 0.1718 0.3920 1.1330 
            
Source: our elaborations on data from ABI and Bank of Italy 
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3 Heterogeneity in MCBs performance: the empty MLM and the time-effect  
This section refers to the estimations obtained when considering different MLN specifications, 
ranging from the MLNs incorporating only time (that is to say with 021    in eq. [5]) to 
the empty model (eq. [6]). Since we use longitudinal data, our hierarchy is made up of three 
levels: time (first level), MCBs (second level) and provinces (third level). Table 2 displays the 
MLMs results for cost efficiency regressions.12 Column 1 of Table 2 refers to the random-
intercept empty model in which the second level is formed by 414 MCBs and the third level by 
66 provinces. There are 2334 observations. In column 2, time enters into the deterministic 
part of the model to depict growth.  Columns 3-5 refer to the estimations adding randomness 
in the second and/or third level slopes. Important diagnostics to choose the best performing 
regression comes from the AIC statistics.  
The first outcome to be discussed is the likelihood-ratio test, which compares the MLN 
with the standard OLS regression. If the null hypothesis is true, OLS can be used instead of a 
variance-components model. The test result of column 1 supports the use of multilevel 
methodology and indicates that the intercept should be considered as a group-by-group 
variant coefficient. The evidence in favor of the multilevel approach holds for each model 
considered in Table 2, thereby supporting the conclusion that Italian MCBs behavior follows a 
hierarchical structure.  
Before discussing the role of individual and local unaccounted heterogeneity, it is 
remarkable to highlight that the coefficient of Time is always negative, indicating that during 
the years of the current crisis the MCBs register significant losses in cost efficiency. This 
estimate confirms the pattern of the red line in Figure 1. However, the nexus between crisis 
and small-banks efficiency deserves to be investigated better, as done by Barra et al. (2014). 
As can be seen from the estimations of the empty model (column 1 of Table 2), the 
province-specific unobservable factors capture 28.27% of the MCBs heterogeneity in 
efficiency, while the remainder is explained by MCBs (28.11%) and time (48.11%) effects. 
Moving from one model to another, the portion of variance explained by each level varies a 
lot.13 For instance, the ICC index of the provinces is high (40.05%) when time enters as source 
of randomness of provincial intercepts and slopes (Models 4 and 5), while the role of 
unaccounted MCBs factors remains broadly the same, falling in the range 21.63% of Models 4 
and 5 and 23.8% of Model 2. In order to provide robustness to the evidence that the 
unobservable-province factors help a lot to detect the heterogeneity of MCBs efficiency, MLM 
regression is re-run year-by-year. In this case, the time-level disappears and the hierarchy is 
at 2 levels -  MCBs and provinces - implying that  estimations refer to a random-intercept 
model, where disturbances from the overall-MCBs mean are just due to location. As the ICC 
for province is extremely high (ranging from 45.5% in 2006 to 30.2% in 2011), the results of 
Table 3 firmly confirm that the environment in which small-banks operate is a key dimension 
to be taken  into account when explaining their individual performance. 
                                                          
12 In running MLM regressions, the dependent variable -  that is the MCBs cost efficiency - has been 
transformed using the following formula: CETrans=ln(CE/(1-CE). This is because CE is never zero or 
unity, thereby making inappropriate the use of a Tobit model, which, on the contrary, performs well 
only if the upper and lower bounds come from non-observability (Maddala 1991; McDonald 2009). 
13 The model-by-model discussion points out (i) the different impact of time in the longitudinal setting 
we propose and (ii) the varying role of each hierarchical level in explaining individual outcome. 
However, the AIC assumes low values in Model 4 and 5 (about 1850) against the high values (from 
1953 to 1960) of Models 1-3, suggesting that the best fitting refer to MLMs with time randomness 
in both MCBs/provincial intercepts and slopes. 
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Table 2  
Explaining heterogeneity in cost efficiency of Italian MCBs over the 2006-2011 period. 
Results from the empty model and MLMs with intercept and slope time randomness. 
 
  
Dep. Variable: Cost Efficiency 
  
N
o
 T
im
e E
ffect 
Time Effect 
    
In
tercep
ts 
Intercepts and II 
level slopes 
Intercepts and III 
level slopes 
Intercepts, II and III 
level slopes 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
Constant 1.469 1.525 1.531 1.595 1.595 
 
  (42.82) (41.35) (40.92) (36.26 ) (36.26) 
 
Time 
 
-0.016 -0.016 -0.036 -0.036 
 
  
 
(-4.13) ( -4.03) (-5.42) (-5.42) 
 
  
     
Random-Effects  
     
 
Variance 
     
 
Provinces (Intercept) 0.0600 0.0599 0.0631 0.0943 0.0943 
 
Provinces (Slope) 
   
0.0016 0.0016 
 
MCBs (Intercept) 0.0502 0.0503 0.0473 0.0518 0.0518 
 
MCBs (Slope) 
  
0.0005 
 
1.62E-25 
 
  Time Random Effect 0.1022 0.1013 0.0991 0.0918 0.0918 
 
Total 0.2124 0.2115 0.2099 0.2396 0.2396 
 
  
     
 
ICC 
     
 
Provinces 28.27% 28.31% 30.08% 40.05% 40.05% 
 
MCBs 23.62% 23.80% 22.73% 21.63% 21.63% 
 
Time 48.11% 47.89% 47.19% 38.32% 38.32% 
 
LR test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
AIC 1960.09 1954.361 1953.77 1849.90 1851.90 
 
  
     
 
Observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334 
 
N. of Groups: 
     
 
MCB level 414 414 414 414 414 
 
Province Level 66 66 66 66 66 
 
Legend: z-value are in brackets. 
    
 
LR test is for the choice between ML and linear regression (H0). 
  
 
AIC=-2*Log-lik+2*k, where k is the number of estimated parameters. 
     Source: see Table 1 
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Table 3  
Explaining heterogeneity in cost efficiency of Italian MCBs performance.  
Evidence from a random-intercept multilevel model by year 
 
 
Explanatory Variables 
Dep. variable: Cost Efficiency 
  
  
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
 
Constant 1.747 1.498 1.348 1.358 1.303 1.569 
 
  (37.87) (33.545) (32.52) (38.23) (36.58) (48.32) 
Random-Effects  
      
 
Variance 
      
 
Provinces 0.104 0.093 0.083 0.052 0.051 0.047 
 
MCBs 0.124 0.143 0.124 0.120 0.121 0.084 
 
  
      
 
ICC provinces 45.5% 39.4% 40.0% 30.2% 29.5% 35.8% 
 
  
      
 
LR test 88.82 82.32 83.15 62.51 66.47 86.21 
 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
Number of Groups 65 65 66 65 65 65 
  Number of observations 377 392 410 394 378 383 
 
Legend: z-value are in brackets. 
      
 
Source: see Table 1 
       
Figure 2 depicts the results of Table 2. It also helps to understand how MLMs for 
longitudinal data actually work for the sample of Italian MCBs. The black line states for the 
overall mean 000  of our MLM, which is the constant term in Models 1-4 of Table 2. In Panels A 
and B, the green line captures the mean at MCBs level, while the red line refers to the 
provincial mean. Panel A of Figure 2 reproduces Model 1 of Table 2, where nothing in the 
fixed or random parts of the model is a function of time. When considering time as part of the 
fixed component of the model (Model 2 of Table 2), the overall grand mean more accurately 
reflects the pattern of cost-efficiency over time. The negative sign of the time slope (-0.016 in 
Model 2) now translates into decreasing lines of the average effect at any level (Panel B). 
Finally, if Time enters into the random parts of the model, estimations will yield a separate 
regression line within each province or MCBs (Panels C and D). 
From the above discussion we can argue that MCBs heterogeneity in performance is 
highly sensitive to individual factors and location. Given this and in order to explain better the 
role of province as a source of variability, the analysis is complemented by augmenting the 
MLMs with some MCBs and provincial observables. 
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Figure 2  
MCBs cost efficiency. MLN results in a graph 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Augmenting the multilevel model with MCBs and provincial-specific 
variables 
This section presents the results obtained when the MLM is augmented through a set of 
individual and provincial variables. Starting from a specification in which time is treated as a 
source of randomness at any level, the aim of this section is twofold. Firstly, the evidence so 
far presented indicates that the proportion of efficiency variability explained by unobservable 
specific-effect is high. Therefore, after considering a selected set of determinants of efficiency, 
we expect to grasp part of this black-box of unaccounted individual heterogeneity. Secondly, 
our main interest remains in understanding the role of location, net of the role exerted by 
observables.  
Regressors inserted in eq. [5] are size, diversification and the equity/total assets ratio 
at MCBs level, whereas at provincial level they concern the banking market concentration, the 
demand for banking service, the branching process and the riskiness of local banking markets. 
They have already been presented (cfr. Table 1). Moreover, in order to control for macro-
economic effects, the provincial GDP per-capita (sourced by ISTAT) is also included.  
While results of Table 4 refer to MLM regressions for the entire sample of MCBs and 
provinces, Table 5 displays the estimates obtained when performing a sensitivity analysis. 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel A
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel B
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel C
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel D
Grand Mean              Province Mean              MCBs Mean    
Grand Mean                               Province Mean                    
MCBs Mean-intercept              MCBs Mean-slope   
Grand Mean                      Province Mean-intercept             
Province Mean-slope                            MCBs Mean   
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Table 4 follows the presentation of Table 1, whereas Table 5 uses the full-specification of the 
mixed-model (that is to say the one with the lowest AIC of Table 4). The sensitivity analysis of 
Table 5 is performed by splitting the sample according to the (i) banks location (northern and 
southern provinces in columns 1 and 2, respectively);  (ii) MCBs cost efficiency distribution 
(1st quartile in column 3, 2nd and 3rd quartiles in column 4 and 4th quartile in column 5); (iii) 
MCBs size distribution in columns 6-8 (dividing the sample by using three areas of size 
distribution, as for efficiency distribution).14  
Before discussing the role of observables, it is meaningful to highlight that the 
multilevel approach allows the possibility of calculating the coefficient of determination and 
obtaining, at any level of the hierarchy, a proportional reduction in the estimated total 
residual variance when moving from the “empty model” to an extended specification of the 
model (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2008).15 The overall fit of Model 5 in Table 4 is 31.69% 
and is the result of a different contribution at each level.  On the one hand, individual-MCBs 
variables absorb 9.8% of the variance estimated at the 2-level of the hierarchy; on the other 
hand, the R2 at provincial-level is 20%. Interestingly, the set of observables at provincial level 
used in Table 4 contributes to explain always more than 20% of efficiency variability that we 
observe at that level, with a peak of 40% in Model 2. Table 5 points out that the goodness of fit 
differs a lot according to the sub-sample of MCBs we refer to. Finally, it is noteworthy to say 
that the observables do not affect the relative values of ICCs. Data of Table 4 show that the 
proportion of MCBs heterogeneity in efficiency explained by location effect remains high, 
falling in the range between 24.22% (Model 2) and 33.08% (Model 5). 
In what follows we summarize econometric results by firstly focusing on the individual 
factors and then discussing the evidence at provincial level. 
At bank level, the first relevant issue regards the efficiency-size nexus. Regressions 
include the SIZE, expressed as the logarithm of total assets of each MCB. There is no prior 
expectation on the sign of the size-effect, as it can be positive (Andries 2011; Drake 2001) or 
negative (Pilloff 1996). We find that MCBs cost efficiency tends to decrease with size. 
However, as size enters into regressions in logarithmic terms, its marginal effect is nonlinear 
and tends to zero as size increases  This is an interesting outcome, as it implies that the 
sensitivity of MCBs efficiency to size is extremely low above a certain threshold. For instance, 
if MCBs average size increased by 10% (passing from the actual 295MLM euro to 324Mld 
euro) the efficiency would diminish by  0.70%,  passing, on average from 0.812 to 0.807 
                                                          
14 We replicate Tables 4 and 5 by addressing the issue of missing values in MLN for longitudinal data 
(Kwok et al. 2008; Little and Rubin 2002). To this end we employ the Stata command “mi impute” 
developed by Royston (2007; 2009). There are 221 missing values over the 2006-2011 period, 
corresponding to less than 10% of the entire sample. However, including missing values into 
regressions does not affect the sign and significance of results displayed in Tables 4 and 5, that is 
those obtained without using the “mi impute” procedure (findings with missing values are available 
upon request). 
15 The total pseudo-R2  for the three-level model is given by: 
222
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  where N stands for the empty model and M for the 
model of interest. The proportional reduction in the variance explained by observables can be 
calculated level-by-level. For instance the proportion of the level-3 variance explained by the 
covariates is: 22223 )( jNjMjNR   ; the proportion of the level-2 variance explained by the 
covariates is: 22222 )( iNiMiNR   ; and the proportion of the level-1 variance explained by the 
covariates is: 22221 )( eNeMeNR    
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(calculations are based on Model 5 in Table 4, because of its lowest AIC). Importantly, the 
negative link between size and cost efficiency holds true whatever the sample we consider in 
Table 5. 
There are some reasons to consider as relevant the diversification of activities for bank 
efficiency. It is argued that income from traditional bank activities suffers lower volatility than 
other financial uses and then the higher the share of risky activities the lower the exposure to 
systematic risk (Vallascas and Keases 2012). However, it is not certain that the higher betas 
coming from diversification compensate the costs for diversifying the sources of income 
(Baele et al. 2007; Wagner 2010). Therefore, there is no expectation on the link between 
income diversification and MCBs efficiency. The evidence suggests that the business model 
matters in influencing MCBs cost efficiency. The coefficients are positive, implying that Italian 
MCBs would gain from diversifying their business other than intermediation within the 
income statement (income diversification). This conclusion is robust to every sample of MCBs 
used in the sensitivity analysis (Table 5). With regard to loan diversification the evidence is 
mixed. In the five MLM specifications used in Table 4 for the entire sample of MCBs, the 
estimated parameter is not significant, inducing no interpretation. However, this average 
effect hides some specificities that the sensitivity analysis helps to capture. Indeed, cost 
efficiency decreases with loan diversification as far as the sample of southern MCBs is 
concerned, while the contrary happens for the MCBs operating in the North of Italy. This is a 
clear signal that location matters. There is also a different impact across efficiency and size 
distributions. For instance, restricting the regression to the 1181 observations lying in the 3rd 
and 4th quartiles of efficiency distribution (column 4 of Table 5),  the effect of loans 
diversification becomes positive, while it is negative in the 1st quartile (column 3). Similarly, 
the impact turns out to be positive in the middle of the size distribution (column 7).  
Another aspect to be addressed regards the role played by the capital structure. In fact, 
the financial capital is related to exposure to risk, in the sense that the more indebted a bank 
the higher the risk of failure that arises in situations of systemic crisis (Acharya and 
Viswanathan 2011). In other words, less equity implies higher risk taken and greater 
leverage, which results in higher borrowing costs. Again, a high level of leverage directly 
affects funding costs, since paid interests imply less profitability for the bank in the income 
statement (Berger and Mester 1997). From these arguments, it is reasonable to assume that 
more leveraged MCBs face high funding costs and then low efficiency scores. In our 
regressions the capital structure is proxied by the ratio equity/total assets, which ranges from 
0 (highly leveraged MCBs) to 1 (financially independent MCBs). The coefficient of the 
equity/total assets ratio is negative, suggesting that an increased amount of capital, for 
instance owing to regulation requirements, can act as a binding restriction and thus is 
perceived by MCBs as a cost. It is worth noticing that the negative relationship between 
equity/total assets and MCBs cost efficiency is robust to any sensitivity check we perform 
(Table 5) 
  Turning back to the specific objective of the paper, it is worth discussing the empirics 
about how the provincial market conditions affect MCBs performance. Results presentation 
begins with the market concentration, which enters into regressions to gauge the effect of the 
consolidation process observed in Italian banking. This is an issue also addressed, among 
many others, by Casu and Girardone (2009) Dongili et al. (2008),Fontani and Vitali (2007) 
and Turati (2008). The uncertainty of the outcome is due to the fact that, on the one hand, the 
consolidation increases individual size with an expected increase in efficiency levels; on the 
other hand, high concentration can cause an increase in banks market power and, therefore, a 
reduction of banks efficiency (Turati 2008). Concentration is measured using the Herfindahl 
Index and Total Assets (HH2) in each province (cfr § 2.3). From our regressions it emerges 
that banking concentration is positively related to MCBs efficiency, meaning that MCBs 
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operating in provinces with more concentrated banking markets attain higher cost efficiency. 
This evidence is robust to every check (Table 5) and consistent with the efficient structure 
hypothesis (Berger 1995; Goldberg and Rai 1996). Phrased differently, in local concentrated 
banking markets, each MCB is induced to be more and more efficient, with the result that in 
provinces with high market concentration there would be a dominance of efficient MCBs. 
Arguments that increased market concentration leads to efficiency improvements are also 
provided by Casu and Girardone (2009) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001).  
Regarding the spatial accessibility to banking services, it is reasonable to argue that 
banking efficiency in the local market can also be affected by the branching that has occurred 
in Italy over the last 20 years. In more detail, it can be expected that the higher the number of 
branches the less MCBs efficiency. This is why a large number of branches exerts negative 
effects on individual efficiency because the operating costs to provide banking services 
increase. Moreover, local markets with a high number of branches would suffer from 
overdimensioning which acts against efficiency. However, the sign may be different, as big-
bank participation in small markets can be positive due to the increases in capital brought by 
big banks, the expertise brought in, risk management and increase in competition (Delis and 
Papanikolaou 2009; Hannan and Prager 2009). This phenomenon is measured province-by-
province with the number of bank branches by square kilometer. The results are in line with 
expectations as the estimated parameter of Branch Density is always negative (Tables 4 and 
5), indicating that Italian MCBs suffer from the huge branch opening process occurring 
throughout the country. This evidence might be due to the fact that the presence of many 
bank branches in local markets forces the individual MCB to invest increasing amount of 
resources for serving more customers, whose expectations is to increase the benefits from 
loans and deposits at better advantageous conditions than those applied by other bank 
branches. Other things being fixed, the increased number of bank branches in local markets 
and the MCBs strategies act against their costs.  
Another issue that the study addresses is the effect on efficiency due to demand effects. 
The hypothesis is that MCBs that operate in markets with a lower density of demand 
(calculated as deposits per square kilometers) face higher expenses to find customers asking 
for banking services (Fries and Taci 2005). Thus, the greater the density of demand, the 
higher will be the banking efficiency levels. These effects are gauged by the demand density 
expressed as total deposits by square kilometer. From estimations it emerges that MCBs cost 
efficiency is positively related to demand density (Table 4). This supports the hypothesis 
according to which MCBs working in provinces with high level of deposits face, ceteris paribus, 
lower costs in mobilizing deposits and making loans. Interesting, the positive link remains 
positive only in the middle of cost efficiency and size distributions, while the evidence is 
inconclusive in the tails (Table 5). 
In order to gauge the effects of market risk on individual efficiency, the variable Market 
Risk enters into MLM equation. It is expressed as the nonperforming loans as share of total 
loans controlling for the localization of customer in every province. Here, the question to be 
understood is whether MCBs gain or lose from operating in local markets with poor credit-
quality. It is likely that MCBs operating in risky markets are exposed to potential efficiency 
losses caused by higher costs of screening and monitoring activities. Results differ according 
to the MLM specification. If the time-effect introduces disturbances in slopes (Model 5 of 
Table 4), then MCBs cost efficiency will be positively related to the local financial markets 
riskiness. This finding is driven by banks lying in the upper tail  of size distribution, while it is 
robust to efficiency distribution and MCBs location (Table 5). This might be due to the fact 
that MCBs save costs from the nature of the relationships with their member-customers. 
These relationships protect MCBs from market riskiness as they are long-dated and based on 
the use of soft-information. 
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Finally, the level of local economic development is an important factor of bank 
performances, because it affects numerous aspects related to the demand and supply of 
banking services (mainly deposits and loans). To this end, the income per capita is used as 
measure of local development. It is expected that provinces with higher income per capita are 
assumed to have a banking system operating in a mature environment and resulting in more 
competitive interest rates and profit margins. They can also exert more financial activity. 
Results are mixed and not robust, given that a significant link has been found only in Models 2 
and 3 of Table 4. Contrasting with expectations, our evidence may be affected by the fact that 
operating in rich areas implies higher operating and financial costs that MCBs would incur in 
offering services (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas 2000). 
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Table 4 
Explaining heterogeneity in cost efficiency of Italian MCBs.  Evidence from MLMs 
with bank and provincial-specific variables over the 2006-2011 period. 
 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 3.183*** 3.144*** 3.272*** 3.172*** 3.240***
(15.99) (15.71) (15.28) (15.74) (15.63)
Fixed-effects
Time -0.010 -0.0127* -0.0447*** -0.0435***
(-1.75) (-2.20) (-5.50) (-5.37)
MCBs level
Size -0.198*** -0.193*** -0.206*** -0.190*** -0.197***
(-13.03) (-12.55) (-12.41) (-12.36) (-12.40)
Loans Diversification 0.159 0.136 0.124 0.00939 0.0108
(1.59) (1.34) (1.19) (0.09) (0.11)
Income Diversification 3.691*** 3.643*** 3.680*** 3.395*** 3.442***
(33.31) (32.02) (32.63) (29.66) (30.20)
Equity/Total Assets -3.654*** -3.569*** -3.799*** -3.453*** -3.569***
(-12.96) (-12.53) (-13.43) (-12.27) (-12.75)
Province level
Market Concentration 0.200** 0.241*** 0.229*** 0.178*** 0.179***
(5.03) (5.20) (5.04) (3.66) (3.76)
Branch Density -121.84*** -129.9*** -128.4*** -168.0*** -163.8***
(-4.07) (-4.31) (-4.13) (-4.37) (-4.30)
Demand Density 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(3.24) (3.61) (3.50) (3.91) (3.85)
Market Risk -0.220 0.221 0.745 2.275*** 2.258***
(-0.73) (0.56) (1.85) (4.90) (4.93)
Local Econ. Development -0.018 -0.019** -0.015* -0.002 -0.002
(-2.40) (-2.59) (-2.07) (-0.27) (-0.29)
Random-Effects 
Variance
Provinces (Intercept) 0.0371 0.0357 0.0373 0.0456 0.0466
Provinces (Slope) 0.0015 0.0014
MCBs (Intercept) 0.0435 0.0432 0.0409 0.0430 0.0446
MCBs  (Slope) 0.0014 0.0006
Time Random Effect 0.0608 0.0686 0.0537 0.0545 0.0518
Total 0.1414 0.1475 0.1333 0.1446 0.1451
ICC
Provinces 26.23% 24.22% 27.98% 32.57% 33.08%
MCBs 30.76% 29.29% 31.72% 29.74% 31.19%
Time 43.01% 46.49% 40.30% 37.68% 35.73%
R
2 
0.3368 0.3053 0.3721 0.3189 0.3169
R2 level 3 0.2761 0.4049 0.3786 0.2153 0.2006
R2 level 2 0.1330 0.1385 0.1570 0.1423 0.0980
R2 level 1 0.0469 0.3286 0.4740 0.4665 0.4927
LR test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log restricted-lik -435.01 -437.77 -416.01 -372.17 -365.54
AIC 896.03 903.53 862.03 774.35 763.07
Number of Groups
Provinces 66 66 66 66 66
MBCs 414 414 414 414 414
Number of observations 2334 2334 2334 2334 2334
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Table 5 
 Explaining heterogeneity in cost efficiency of Italian MCBs. Evidence from MLMs 
with bank and provincial-specific variables. A sensitivity analysis (2006-2011) 
 
 
 5. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the efficiency of MCBs over the 2006-2011 period by using the 
multilevel approach for longitudinal data. The underlying idea is that MCBs efficiency is the 
result of individual behavior and of local market-specific conditions. While the existing 
studies on this topic use single-equation model, we combine contextual and micro links within 
the multilevel  model, which properly handle the embeddedness of MCBs in geographically 
narrowed markets. The preferred model is an equation where intercepts randomly vary 
across MCBs and provinces and time is modeled as a source of randomness of intercepts and 
slopes. As the main research-question is about the role of local markets, the descriptive 
analysis of data allows one to reveal that there are several significant differences at provincial 
level: despite the reforms, the Italian banking market is still highly heterogeneous, with 
North South 1st 2nd and 3rd 4th 1st 2nd and 3rd 4th
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Constant 2.512*** 4.442*** 4.634*** 1.419** 2.012*** 0.699** 1.917*** 2.852***
(10.95) (8.95) (5.84) (2.90) (3.30) (3.13) (16.71) (15.78)
Fixed-effects
Time -0.0298*** -0.0891*** -0.0658*** -0.0369*** -0.00952 0.0115 -0.00152 -0.0416***
(-3.39) (-5.26) (-3.93) (-3.61) (-0.71) (1.13) (-0.33) (-5.84)
MCBs level
Size -0.159*** -0.274*** -0.294*** -0.0733 -0.120** -0.0189 -0.059*** -0.083***
(-9.40) (-6.71) (-4.12) (-1.86) (-2.62) (-1.13) (-6.88) (-5.69)
Loans Diversification 0.330** -0.704*** -0.487* 0.552*** 0.247 0.158 0.158* -0.101
(2.70) (-3.59) (-2.47) (3.75) (1.12) (1.20) (2.36) (-1.09)
Income Diversification 3.438*** 3.528*** 3.678*** 3.743*** 3.282*** 1.589*** 1.058*** 1.049***
(24.97) (16.27) (14.71) (22.9) (17.16) (8.05) (10.18) (7.83)
Equity/Total Assets -1.661*** -4.376*** -4.067*** -1.02 0.345 -1.492*** -1.061*** 0.151
(-3.38) (-10.92) (-8.48) (-0.62) (0.16) (-4.70) (-4.48) (0.57)
Province level
Market Concentration 0.178*** 0.302* 0.329* 0.271*** -0.049 -0.001 0.054 0.196*
(3.57) (1.97) (2.33) (4.58) (-0.73) (-0.02) (1.45) (2.40)
Branch Density -114.8** -57.66 -137.4 -202.8*** -48.32 25.86 -50.10** -72.22*
(-3.04) (-0.25) (-1.31) (-3.83) (-1.05) -0.9 (-2.65) (-2.13)
Demand Density 0.003** 0.017** 0.004 0.005** 0.001 -0.001 0.001* 0.002
(2.66) (2.82) (1.08) (3.16) (1.14) (-0.78) (2.35) (1.86)
Market Risk 2.697*** 1.630* 1.917* 1.696** 2.096* 0.685 0.368 0.769*
(4.13) (2.12) (2.20) (2.80) (2.09) (1.12) (1.22) (1.98)
Local Econ. Development 0.009 -0.014 -0.031 0.011 0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.019*
(1.00) (-1.09) (-1.70) (1.09) (0.01) (0.69) (0.38) (-1.96)
Random-Effects 
Variance
Provinces (Intercept) 0.0320 0.0457 0.0025 0.0035 0.0040 0.0456 0.0506 0.0657
Provinces (Slope) 0.0010 0.0015 0.0003 0.00006 0.00006 0.0010 0.0014 0.0020
MCBs (Intercept) 0.0370 0.0472 0.0130 0.0051 0.0065 0.0323 0.0479 0.0246
MCBs  (Slope) 0.0003 0.0015 6.21E-23 0.00010 2.95E-25 0.0009 0.0005 0.0006
Time Random Effect 0.0520 0.0478 0.0400 0.0189 0.0249 0.0871 0.0383 0.0331
Total 0.1223 0.1437 0.0558 0.0277 0.0355 0.1669 0.1387 0.1260
ICC
Provinces 26.98% 32.85% 5.02% 12.86% 11.44% 27.94% 37.49% 53.73%
MCBs 30.50% 33.89% 23.30% 18.79% 18.33% 19.87% 34.90% 19.99%
Time 42.52% 33.26% 71.68% 68.35% 70.22% 52.19% 27.61% 26.27%
LR test (p value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log restricted-lik -239.50 -95.34 15.81 472.82 158.78 -218.13 -78.95 -7.11
AIC 510.99 222.69 0.39 -913.63 -285.56 468.25 189.90 46.22
Number of Groups
      Provinces 42 24 57 65 58 46 60 42
      MBCs 312 102 222 380 232 122 241 119
Number of observations 1784 550 584 1166 584 557 1181 596
Banks Location Cost Efficiency Distribution                             Size Distribution (by quartile)
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marked differences between the North and the South of the country. Importantly, the main 
results of the study are shown to be robust with regard to model specification and across 
different samples of banks. 
The study yields two main results. The first evidence regards the role of localization in 
different provinces. From this perspective, several points stand out. Above all, we find that  
heterogeneity in efficiency can, to a large extent, be explained by unobserved province-
specific factors. For instance, in the empty model, provinces explain about one-third of 
efficiency heterogeneity, while this proportion is one-fifth in the most extended model (the 
one with observables at individual and contextual levels and with time-randomness in 
intercepts and slopes). Furthermore, the study emphasizes the positive link between 
efficiency and market concentration. Other robust insights come from the demand density 
and the branch density, which positively and negatively affect efficiency. The evidence from 
credit quality indicates that MCBs efficiency is not to be related to the market risk. When 
trying to summarize the effects of local market conditions, the analysis induces an indirect 
assessment of deregulation, although the study is not centered on evaluation. In this respect, 
the finding that high market concentration is positively linked to MCBs efficiency could be 
considered as an implication of reforms carried out over the last 15 years. In this sense a 
virtuous-circle seems to be at work: market concentration in the periphery makes MCBs in 
those markets more efficient and then viable. This is in line with the intentions of regulators, 
as the scope to maintain market efficiency is an expected result of market consolidation. At 
the same time, MCBs viability preserves the small market to be served. However, the negative 
effect of branching on MCBs efficiency acts against the full effectiveness of reforms, as the 
impressive branch opening is seen as a threat for efficiency and thus MCBs survival. 
Secondly, heterogeneity in cost efficiency is affected by bank-specific factors. For 
instance, in the empty model, the proportion of MCBs efficiency variability brought about by 
the bank-level of our hierarchy is high, ranging from one quarter in the empty model to one 
third in the full-mixed model. While these results imply that the unobserved heterogeneity in 
MCB-behavior is an important source of heterogeneity in efficiency, they should be looked at 
in greater depth. In this respect, regressions incorporate the effect of a set of bank-specific 
variables relating to size, diversification and capital structure. Two lessons have been learnt: 
on the one hand, looking at the impact on efficiency exerted by each factor, it is found that 
MCBs efficiency always increases with income diversification and when small-banks are 
financial dependent on external finance, while it is negatively related with size, although the 
marginal effect is rather small; on the other hand, the capacity of the above bank-level 
variables to explain the total efficiency variability is evaluated. It is shown that the bank-
specific variables explain, as a whole, nine per cent of first-level efficiency variance, implying 
that much of efficiency heterogeneity at individual basis is still unexplained. Something other 
than size, diversification and capital structure influences heterogeneity in MCBs efficiency. 
This leaves room for further research with the aim of refining the measurement issues 
relating to other bank-level aspects, such as management competence and organizational 
practices. It would be interesting to analyze these issues in greater depth so as to minimize 
the “sizable” and “unobservable” black box of MCBs behavior. On the one hand, the paper 
suggests that MCBs-based reforms could be highly advantageous for efficiency gains, as they 
would act within the level that this study demonstrates, as expected, to be an important 
dimension in explaining efficiency. Limiting the discussion to the organizational efficiency 
nexus, it seems that policy making might be better oriented to stimulate organizational 
changes of MCBs as a whole, preserving, however, the specific nature of being small banks. 
Hence, any reform ought to be oriented to assure service to customers in the periphery. In this 
regard, a reform allowing MCBs to use soft information and lean-relationship could be a good 
option, as it would guarantee some advantages to MBCs over big banks.  
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Appendix Table A  
Territorial breakdown of MCBs, by province(2006-2011) 
Provinces 
Number of MCBs 
observations  
Provinces 
Number of MCBs 
observations 
     Agrigento 20 
 
Macerata 18 
Ancona 42 
 
Mantua 14 
Arezzo 12 
 
Matera 2 
Ascoli Piceno 22 
 
Messina 12 
Avellino 18 
 
Milan 60 
Bari 76 
 
Padua 48 
Benevento 11 
 
Palermo 32 
Bergamo 54 
 
Perugia 24 
Bologna 35 
 
Pesaro-Urbino 36 
Bolzano 292 
 
Pisa 13 
Brescia 63 
 
Pistoia 42 
Brindisi 12 
 
Pordenone 12 
Caltanissetta 36 
 
Potenza 23 
Campobasso 13 
 
Ravenna 12 
Caserta 12 
 
Reggio Emilia 18 
Catania 12 
 
Rimini 22 
Catanzaro 23 
 
Rome 67 
Chieti 12 
 
Rovigo 24 
Como 18 
 
Salerno 81 
Cosenza 34 
 
Siena 31 
Cremona 28 
 
Syracuse 19 
Crotone 9 
 
Taranto 29 
Cuneo 46 
 
Teramo 22 
Florence 42 
 
Trapani 18 
Forlì-Cesena 36 
 
Trento 275 
Frosinone 17 
 
Treviso 36 
Gorizia 25 
 
Udine 48 
Grosseto 24 
 
Venice 24 
Latina 22 
 
Verona 42 
Lecce 12 
 
Vibo Valentia 12 
Lecco 12 
 
Vicenza 60 
Leghorn 15 
 
Viterbo 22 
Lodi 18 
   Lucca 13   Italy 2334 
Source: our elaborations on data from ABI and Bank of Italy. 
 
 
23 
 
 
References 
Acharya V.V., Viswanathan S. (2011) “Leverage, Moral Hazard, and Liquidity”, Journal of 
Finance,  46, 99-138 
Aiello F., Pupo V.,Ricotta F. (2014) “Explaining Total Factor Productivity at Firm Level in Italy: 
Does Location Matter?”, Spatial Economic Analysis, 9 (1),1-20 
Aiello F., Pupo V.,Ricotta F. (2015) “Firm Heterogeneity in TFP, sectorial innovation and 
location. Evidence from Italy”, International Review of Applied Economics 29(5),546-571  
Aigner D., Lovell C.A.K., Schmidt P. (1977) “Formulation and Estimation of Stochastic Frontier 
Production Function Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 6, 21-37 
Alessandrini P., Presbitero A.F., Zazzaro A. (2009) “Banks, Distances and Firms’ Financing 
Constraints”, Review of Finance, 13, 2, 261-307 
Andries A.M. (2011) “The Determinants of Bank Efficiency and Productivity Growth in the 
Central and Eastern European Banking Systems”, Eastern European Economics, 49, 6, 
38-59 
Baele L., De Jonghe O., Vennet R.V. (2007) “Does the Stock Market Value Bank 
Diversification?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 7, 1999-2023 
Baldwin R.E., Okubo T. (2006) “Heterogeneous firms, agglomeration and economic geography: 
spatial selection and sorting”, Journal of Economic Geography, 6,323-346 
Barra C., Destefanis S., Lubrano Lavadera G. (2014), The Crisis and the Efficiency of Italian 
Cooperative Banks, Paper Presented at the 55th Annual Meeting of the Italian 
Economic Society, 23-25 October 2014, Trento (Italy) 
Battaglia F., Farina V., Fiordelisi F., Ricci O. (2010) “The Efficiency of Cooperative Banks: the 
Impact of Environmental Economic Conditions”, Applied Financial Economics, 20, 17,  
1363-1376 
Battese G.E., Coelli T.J. (1995) “A Model for Technical Inefficiency Effects in a Stochastic 
Frontier Production Function for Panel Data”, Empirical Economics, 20, 2, 325-332 
Berger A.N. (1995) “The Profit-Structure Relationship in Banking-Tests of Market-Power and 
Efficient-Structure Hypotheses”, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 27, 2, 404-431 
Berger A.N., Mester L.J. (1997) “Inside the Black Box: What Explains Differences in the 
Efficiencies of Financial Institutions?”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 21, 7, 895-947  
Beugelsdijk S. (2007) “The regional environment and a firm’s innovative performance: a plea 
for a multilevel inter-actionist approach”, Economic Geography, 83,181-199 
Bickel R. (2007) Multilevel Analysis for Applied Research, It’s Just Regression!, The Guilford 
Press, New York 
Bos J.W.B., Kool C.J.M. (2006) “Bank Efficiency: the Role of Bank Strategy and Local Market 
Conditions”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, 1953-74 
Carbò Valverde S., Humphrey D.B., Rodriguez F.R. (2003) “Deregulation, Bank Competition 
and Regional Growth”, Regional Studies, 37, 3, 227-237  
Casu B., Molyneux P. (2003) “A Comparative Study of Efficiency in European Banking”, Applied 
Economics, 35, 17, 1865-1876 
Coccorese P. (2009) “Market Power in Local Banking Monopolies”, Journal of Banking and 
Finance, 33, 1196-2120   
Delis M., Papanikolaou N. (2009) “Determinants of Bank Efficiency: Evidence from a Semi-
parametric Methodology”, MPRA, Working Paper N. 13893 
Demirgüç-Kunt A., Levine R. (2001) Bank-based and Market-based Financial Systems: Cross-
Country Comparisons. In Demirgüç-Kunt A., Levine R. (Eds.): Financial Structure and 
24 
 
Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Comparison of Banks, Markets, and Development. 
MIT Press, Cambridge 
Dietsch M., Lozano-Vivas  A. (2000) “How the Environment Determines Banking Efficiency: a 
Comparison between French and Spanish Industries”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
24, 985-1004 
Dongili P., Rossi S.P.S., Zago A. (2008) “Efficienza e competitività delle banche italiane: un 
confronto con alcuni sistemi bancari europei”. In Cella G., Zago A. (Eds.): Competitività 
ed efficienza dell’economia italiana: fattori sistemici e valutazioni quantitative. Il Mulino: 
Bologna 
Dosi G., Nelson R. (2010) “Technical Change and Industrial Dynamics as Evolutionary 
Processes.” In Handbook of the Economics of Innovation,  Hall, and N. Rosenberg (Eds). 
London: North Holland 
Drake L. (2001) “Efficiency and Productivity Change in UK Banking”, Applied Financial 
Economics, 11, 5, 557-571 
Fazio G.,Piacentino D. (2010) “A Spatial Multilevel Analysis of Italian SMEs' Productivity” 
Spatial Economic Analysis, 5(3), 299-316 
Fiordelisi F., Mare D.S. (2013) “Probability of Default and Efficiency in Cooperative Banking”, 
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 26, 30-45 
Fontani A., Vitali L. (2007) “L’efficienza di costo dei gruppi bancari italiani: un’analisi mediante 
frontiera stocastica”, Department of Economics and Business, Luiss, Rome  
Fries S., Taci A., (2005) “Cost Efficiency of Banks in Transition: Evidence from 289 Banks in 15 
Post-Communist Countries”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 1, 55-81 
Giannola A. (2009) Bank Mergers and Credit Allocation Among Italian Regions. In Silipo  D.B. 
(Ed.): The Banks and the Italian Economy. Springer Phisyca-Verlag: Berlin Heidelberg 
Girardone C., Molyneux P., Gardener E.P.M. (2004) “Analysing the Determinants of Bank 
Efficiency: the Case of Italian Banks”, Applied Economics, 36, 3, 215-227 
Goldberg L.G., Rai A. (1996) “The Structure-Performance relationship for European Banking”, 
Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 4, 745-771 
Goldstein H. 2003. Multilevel Statistical Models, London, Arnold 
Gutiérrez E. (2008) “The Reform of Italian Cooperative Banks: Discussion and Proposals”, IMF 
WP/08/74, IMF Washington 
Heck R.H., Thomas S.L. (2000) An introduction to multilevel modelling techniques. Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, New Jersey 
Hox J.J. (2002) Multilevel analysis: techniques and applications. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 
Mahwah, New Jersey 
Hannan T.H., Prager R.A. (2009) “The Profitability of Small Single-Market Banks in an era of 
Multi-Market Banking”, Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 2, 263-271 
Hughes J.P., Mester I.J. (2008) “Efficiency in Banking: theory, practice and evidence”, WP 
08/01, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelfia, Philadelfia, USA  
Kwok O.-M., Underhill A.T., Berry J.W., Luo W., Elliott T.R., Yoon M. (2008) “Analyzing 
Longitudinal Data with Multilevel Models: an Example with Individuals Living with 
Lower Extremity Intra-articular Fractures”, Rehabilitation Psychology, 53, 3, 370-386 
Little R.J.A., Rubin D.B. (2002) Statistical Analysis with Missing Data, 2nd ed. Hoboken, NJ: 
Wiley 
Luke A. (2014) Multilevel Modelling. London: Sage 
Maddala G.S. (1991) “A Perspective on the Use of Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables 
Models in Accounting Research”, Accounting Review, 66, 788-807 
Mass J.M, Hox J.J. (2004) ”Robustness issues in multilevel regression analysis. Statistica 
Neederlandica 58: 127-137 
25 
 
Maudos J., Pastor J.M., Perez F., Quesada J. (2002) “Cost and Profit Efficiency in European 
Banks”, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 12, 1, 33-58 
McDonald J. (2009) “Using Least Squares and Tobit in Second Stage DEA Efficiency Analyses”, 
European Journal of Operational Research, 197, 792-798 
Meeusen D., van de Broek J. (1997) “Efficiency Estimation from Cobb-Douglas Production 
Functions with Composed Error”, International Economic Review, 18, 2, 435-444 
Messori M., Tamburini R., Zazzaro A. (2003) Il sistema bancario italiano, Carocci Editore: Rome 
Pilloff S.J. (1996) “Performance Changes and Shareholder Wealth Creation: Associated with 
Mergers of Publicly Traded Banking Institutions, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 
28, 3, 59-78 
Rabe-Hesketh S., Skrondal A. (2008) Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata. Stata 
Press, 2nd edition 
Raspe O.,F. van Oort F. (2011) “Firm Heterogeneity, Productivity, and Spatially Bounded 
Knowledge Externalities”, Socio-Economic Planning Sciences 45: 38-47 
Richter T. (2006) “What is wrong with ANOVA and multiple regression? Analyzing sentence 
reading times with hierarchical linear models”, Discourse Processes, 41(3): 221-250 
Romer P. 1986. “Increasing returns and long-run growth.” Journal of Political Economy 94: 
1002-1037 
Royston P. (2007) “Multiple Imputation of Missing Values: Further Update of Ice, with an 
Emphasis on Interval Censoring”, Stata Journal, 7, 445-464 
Royston P. (2009) “Multiple Imputation of Missing Values: Further Update of Ice, with an 
Emphasis on Categorical Variables”, Stata Journal, 9, 466-477 
Silipo D.B. (2009) The Banks and the Italian Economy. Springer Phisyca-Verlag: Berlin 
Heidelberg 
Snijders T.A.B.,Bosker R.J. (2008) “Diagnostic checks for multilevel models” in Handbook of 
multilevel Analysis, Jan de Leeuw (Eds.), New York: Springer 
Srholec, M. 2010. “Multilevel Approach to Geography of Innovation.” Regional Studies 44:1207-
1220. 
Srholec M. (2015) “Understanding the Diversity of Cooperation on Innovation across 
Countries.” Economics of Innovation and New Technology 24(1-2): 159-182 
Turati G. (2008) “La valutazione del grado di concorrenza nell’industria bancaria negli anni 
Novanta”. In Cella G., Zago A. (Eds.): Competitività ed efficienza dell’economia italiana: 
fattori sistemici e valutazioni quantitative, Il Mulino: Bologna 
Vallascas F., Keasey K. (2012) “Bank Resilience to Systemic Shocks and the Stability of Banking 
Systems: Small is Beautiful”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 31, 1745-1776 
van Oort, F.G., Burger M.J.,  Knoben J., Raspe O. (2012) “Multilevel Approaches and the Firms 
Agglomeration Ambiguity in Economic Growth Studies”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 
26: 468-491 
Wagner W. (2010) “Diversification at Financial Institutions and Systemic Crises”, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 19, 373-386 
 
 
 
